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KENT GRAYSON, DEVON JOHNSON, and DER-FA ROBERT CHEN*
Customers are influenced not only by how much they trust a company

and its representatives but also by how much they trust the broader

context in which the market exchange is taking place. In this article, the
authors test two rival sociological perspectives regarding the influence
of customer trust in the broader context. One perspective proposes that

trust in the context replaces trust in individual firms and their

representatives. This view suggests that firm/representative trust is not
always critical, especially for customers with high trust in the context. An
alternative perspective is that trust in the context fosters and legitimates trust in firms and their representatives. This view implies that firm/
representative trust is a necessary mediator of the influence of trust in

the context. The authors test predictions based on both perspectives,
using empirical results from two studies implemented in two countries.

The results from both studies support the proposition that trust in firms
and their representatives is a necessary mediator of trust in the broader

context.

Keywords: trust, customer relationship management, financial services
marketing, sociological theories

Is Firm Trust Essential in a Trusted

Environment? How Trust in the Business
Context Influences Customers

Over the past 15 years, several studies have shown that
trust can have a positive influence on the behaviors and attitudes of a company's customers and channel partners. For
example, researchers have suggested that trust encourages

lower opportunism (Rindfleisch and Moorman 2003);
higher customer loyalty (Agustin and Singh 2005); more
service usage (Maltz and Kohli 1996); greater commitment

(Jap and Ganesan 2000); and more collaborative, cooperative, and interactive exchange relationships (Cannon and
Perreault 1999; Hibbard, Kumar, and Stern 2001; Jap and

Anderson 2003). Several studies have also identified specific actions that companies can undertake to enhance trust.
For example, companies can encourage trust by communi-

cating well with customers (Anderson and Weitz 1989;

Doney and Cannon 1997), satisfying them (Ganesan 1994),

and fostering interdependent relationships with them
*Kent Grayson is Associate Professor of Marketing, Kellogg School of

Management, Northwestern University (e-mail: k-grayson@kellogg.
northwestern.edu). Devon Johnson is Assistant Professor of Marketing,
College of Business Administration, Northeastern University (e-mail:
d.johnson@neu.edu). Der-Fa Robert Chen is Professor of Management,

Shenzhen School of Business, Peking University, Shenzhen, China (email: derfa@szpku.edu.cn). The authors thank the Co-Operative Bank and
four other banking organizations, which prefer to remain anonymous, for
sponsoring this research. They also thank Tim Ambler, Jeanne Brett, Doug

Bowman, Dawn Iacobucci, David Shulman, and Craig Smith, as well as
the anonymous JMR reviewers, for their helpful comments and suggestions on previous drafts of this article. Jeff Inman served as associate edi-

tor for this article.

(Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995b).
However, as practitioners and regulators often argue, cus-

tomer trust is influenced not only by the actions of an
organization and its representatives but also by the broader
context in which the exchange is taking place. For example,
financial services executives have suggested that a climate
of trust in their industry (fostered in part by professional

associations) is needed to maximize customer willingness
to use financial advisers (Starkman 2005). Similarly, government officials have observed that trust in the pharmaceu-

tical industry as a whole needs to be enhanced by better
regulation so that patients will be more likely to adopt new

and existing vaccines (Burton 2005). As another example,
(c) 2008, American Marketing Association
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Internet analysts have observed between
that broad-scope
low trust
in the trust,
Web
and narrow-scope
we discuss
domain discourages customer response
online
advertisthem each into
more
detail. Drawing
on previous work on
ing and that third-party guarantors
trust
(e.g.,
Web site
trust, weof
specify
two types
of narrow-scope
trust -interperverifiers) can help create a context
in which
customers
sonal trust
and firm-specific
trust -and twofeel
types of broadmore comfortable responding to
scope
specific
trust -systemcompany
trust and generalized
promotrust.
tions (Hulme 2005). In this article, we empirically test the
influence of trust in the broader context
onAND
customer
NARROW-SCOPE
BROAD-SCOPE perTRUST
ceptions and behaviors.
Many academics have joined practitioners
and regulators
Narrow-Scope Trust
in arguing that trust in the business context influences custhat a purchasing
manager for a car repair shop
tomers and, therefore, company Imagine
performance.
However,
meeting for the first
time with
a salesperson
for an auto
these scholars have offered twoiscompeting
views
about
the
supplier.
thison
initial
interaction, the manager
nature of this influence, each ofparts
which
is During
based
a differwill not have enough
information
or experience with the
ent sociological theory. One perspective
is based
on funcsalesperson
to
have
strong
partner-specific
tionalist theory and posits a negative relationship betweentrust (Dwyer,
Schurr, and Oh 1987). Instead, the manager's trust in this
customer trust in the business context and customer trust in
particular
salesperson (and the salesperson's organization)
firms and their representatives (e.g., Luhmann 1979). The
other is based on institutional theory and posits a positive will grow in increments over time (Hardin 1992; Jones an
relationship (e.g., Bachmann 2004). Although some previ-

George 1998). Zucker (1986) calls this "process-based

data collected in two countries. Although customers in each
country reported a different average level of trust in the
business context, we replicated the substantive results from
our first study (implemented in the United Kingdom) in our
second study (implemented in Taiwan). Both studies support the institutional theory prediction that a trusted busi-

people use different types of information to develop trust i
each (Kramer, Brewer, and Hanna 1996). To reflect this difference, we use the term "interpersonal trust" to refer to
trust in an individual and "firm-specific trust" to refer t
trust in an organization.

ous research (mostly outside marketing) has assessed the trust," emphasizing that this type of trust grows through
influence of trust in the business context, we are aware of process of gathering information about a relationship partno published study that has tested these rival views against ner. This information often comes through first-hand inter
each other. By empirically comparing the two rival models, actions, but second-hand data about the partner (e.g., reputational information) can give this sort of trust a head star
we shed useful light on which model is more empirically
supportable, and we provide evidence regarding the influ- (Bouty 2000; Kollock 1994). Previous research has shown
that narrow-scope trust can develop in relation to either a
ence of trust in the context versus trust in firms and their
human being or an organization (Doney and Cannon 1997).
representatives.
The results of our empirical test are based on customer Trust in both a person and an organization is fostered by

process of partner-specific information gathering, bu

ness context fosters customer trust in firms and does not

Broad-Scope Trust
serve as a substitute for it, as the functionalist theory perspective suggests. Both studies also support the institutional In addition to narrow-scope trust, customers may develop
theory prediction that trust in a firm and its representatives broad-scope trust, which is trust in the social context in

mediates trust in the business context. That is, despite which the relationship is taking place (Driscoll 1978).

potential cultural differences between the respondents in Broad-scope trust applies to all organizations and individuour two studies, trust in the context appears to operate in als operating within a particular context. In contrast to a
similar ways. These results contribute to answering both purchasing manager's trust in a specific auto parts salestheoretical and practical questions about how trust in the person, broad-scope trust is a manager's trust in the auto
context fosters economic and firm performance. In particu- parts industry as a whole. Importantly, our term "broadlar, they emphasize the indirect role of trust in the contextscope trust" refers not to trust that is held broadly by al
and the critical mediating role of customer trust in firms customers in a marketplace but rather to the trust that a particular customer has in the business context in which a set
and their representatives.
In line with many previous studies in marketing (e.g., of organizations and individuals operate. Customers within

Doney, Cannon, and Mullen 1998; Geyskens, Steenkamp, the same marketplace may have similar levels of broadand Kumar 1998), we define "trust" as a belief that an scope trust (just as they are likely to have similar levels of
exchange partner is benevolent and honest. To facilitate dis- narrow-scope trust [Doney, Cannon, and Mullen 1998]), but

cussion of different kinds of trust, we use the term "narrow- there will also be variance. Certain customers will trust the

scope trust" to refer to customer trust in individual firms context more than others. In this study, we focus on two
and their representatives. This kind of trust is narrow in types of broad-scope trust: system trust and generalized
scope because it affects only the relationship in which it has trust.
System trust. A customer's broad-scope trust is infludeveloped and thus has a relatively limited scope of influence. In contrast, we use the term "broad-scope trust" to enced by his or her belief that third parties will publicize
refer to a customer's trust in the broader social context in
information about those who break trust (Milgrom, North,
which a relationship might develop. This trust is broad in and Weingast 1990) and will impose punishments for
scope because it affects a customer's behaviors and percep- untrustworthy behavior (Hardin 1996). This is system trust,
tions regarding not a specific relationship but rather a whole which Lewis and Weigert (1985, p. 973) define as "trust in
class of existing and potential relationships. Before describ- the functioning of bureaucratic sanctions and safeguards."
ing two theoretical perspectives regarding the association Similarly, McKnight, Cummings, and Chervany (1998, p.
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cally oriented
theories, andas
both a
argue
that broad-scop
474) refer to this kind
of trust
"belief
t
trust helpslikelihood
reduce complexity and uncertainty
for cus
structures support one's
for succ
situation." Shapiro (1987)
tomers. However,
also
each perspective
emphasizes
posits that this reductio
of customer confidence
occurs through
in third-party
different social mechanisms. One
"guar
perspective is basedpartners
on functionalist theory
and argues
that broadwhich monitor exchange
and
create
scope trust is trust.
a functional substitute
for narrow-scope trus
straints against breaking
Examples
of
and, therefore, thatregulatory
an efficient economic system
will no
trust include governmental
bodi
high levels
of both. In contrast,
scholars supporting
associations, and the exhibit
legal
system
(Citrin
19
Choe 1998; Lane and
the institutional
Bachmann
theory perspective1996).
argue that broad-scop
Sy

context

specific

because
it
tonarrow-scop
a cu
trust legitimizes
andrefers
therefore encourages

regarding the regulation
ofsuggest
a particular
act
trust. Both views
that broad-scope trust plays
an
Thus, a purchasing manager
important role in relation
may
to narrow-scope
have
trust,
relat
but each
tem trust in the autoview
parts
sector
but
relativ
is based on different
assumptions
about
how economic
trust in the stationery
supply
sector.
systems
develop and operate.
Each also suggests a differen
Generalized trust. Previous research has identified a seckind of relationship between broad-scope and narrow-scop
ond type of broad-scope trust: trust in people in general.
trust and posits a different role for broad-scope trust in fos
Zucker (1986) calls this the "background expectations" tering good customer relationships. An overview of the tw
component of trust (see also Driscoll 1978), and it is a tenperspectives appears in Table 1, and we describe each i
dency to trust all members of a particular social system,
more detail subsequently.
regardless of sector or context. Because it is not situationally influenced, this trust has been reasonably referred to as The Functionalist Theory View
a disposition to trust (McKnight, Cummings, and Chervany
Functionalist perspectives begin with the premise that
1998). However, it is influenced not only by basic psychosocial systems depend on the effective and efficient enact
logical tendencies but also by cultural socialization (Sulli-

van et al. 1981), family upbringing (Hardin 1992), and
socioeconomic status (Fukuyama 1995). Therefore, this
kind of trust also reflects a person's beliefs about appropriate relationship norms, which are learned through multiple
interactions over time. What is important for our study is
not whether a customer's trust is a trait or a state. Instead,
we are interested in whether the target of a customer's trust

is an individual entity (narrow-scope trust) or an entire
group of entities (broad-scope trust). To refer to customer
trust in people in general, we use Humphrey and Schmitz's

(1996) term "generalized trust." A purchasing manager's
generalized trust affects interactions with all potential suppliers, regardless of whether they are auto parts salespeople
or stationery providers. In our research, we examine how
generalized and system trust (broad-scope trust) influence
interpersonal and firm-specific trust (narrow-scope trust).
In the next section, we present two perspectives regarding

the nature of this influence.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BROAD-SCOPE AND

NARROW-SCOPE TRUST: TWO PERSPECTIVES

ment of certain critical functions (Durkheim 1933). Fo
example, Luhmann (1979) argues that advanced societie
are so complex that they cannot survive without a soci

mechanism that serves the function of reducing uncertainty
for social and economic actors. Often, a particular function
(e.g., uncertainty reduction) can be served by any one of
several social mechanisms (e.g., social trust, governmental

autocracy). Most functionalist theories predict that ove

time, redundant and/or inefficient mechanisms will be cas
aside and that the most efficient set of mechanisms will

emerge (Merton 1957). Transaction cost economics is an
example of a functionalist theoretical stance (Dow 1987;
Weeks and Galunic 2003), as evidenced, for example, by its
prediction that efficient governance structures will develop
to handle necessary transactional functions.
Scholars who take a functionalist perspective on the role

of broad-scope trust include Luhmann (1979) and

Fukuyama (1995). This perspective recognizes that trust is
needed to serve the function of reducing uncertainty and
complexity in economic life. It also recognizes that because
narrow-scope trust must be built from scratch each time

someone encounters a new exchange partner, its

Scholars have expressed a range of views regardinguncertainty-reducing
the
function is costly in complex eco-

association between broad-scope and narrow-scope nomic
trust,systems in which interactions with nonkin and

and among these views, two sets of predictions can bestrangers
idenare frequent. Because broad-scope trust does not
tified (Rousseau et al. 1998). Both are based on sociologineed to be built from scratch with each new relationship, it

Table 1
A SUMMARY OF THE FUNCTIONALIST AND INSTITUTIONAL THEORY VIEWS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BROAD-SCOPE
AND NARROW-SCOPE TRUST

When a Customer's Broad-Scope Trust Is Lower ... When a Customer's Broad-Scope Trust Is Higher ...
The functionalist theory view Narrow-scope trust will be higher because narrow-scope
Narrow-scope trust will be lower because its function is
trust must serve the function that lower broad-scope trust
being more efficiently served by broad-scope trust.
is not serving.
The institutional theory view

Narrow-scope trust will also be lower because the
Narrow-scope trust will also be higher because the
legitimating strength of broad-scope trust is also lower.
legitimating strength of broad-scope trust is also higher.
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is a more efficient and cost-effective
way oftheory
serving
some
institutional
predicts
that b

of the uncertainty-reducing function
that
narrow-scopetrust
trust and that
imizes
narrow-scope
serves. Thus, more broad-scope trust
leads
to less narrowthe two
is positive
rather than negat

scope trust because the former moves
in to
serve
somecited
of
Because
the
scholars
in the
the function of the latter. Broad-scope
trust published
allows people
tocredible
tions have
two
shift their focus of trust "from regarding
a personal relationship
to a
the relationship
betw
social mechanism" (Hosmer 1995,
p. 388). Most
scholars
narrow-scope
trust,
we began this r
supporting the functionalist viewpredispositions
do not argue that
the which
focus argume
about
shifts so completely that narrow-scope
trust become
unnecor supportable.
Instead,
we develope
essary. Instead, they argue that studies
when broad-scope
is
as a test oftrust
the competing
h
higher, narrow-scope trust is lower
in Luhmann's
each because,
argument.
We list these next a
(1979, p. 45) words, narrow-scope
supporting
trust "is
each
only
in Table
formed
1.
where it is needed." Alternatively,Hia
when
broad-scope
trust
is
(functionalist): The higher
a custo

lower, people still need the safeguarding
that narrow-s
the lower function
is the customer's

comes from trust and, not finding Hib
enough
of it at the
broad(institutional):
The
higher a custo

the
higher is the level.
customer's narrowscope level, develop more of it at the
narrow-scope

The Institutional Theory View

THE INFLUENCE OF BROAD-SCOPE AND NARROW-

Institutional theory paints a different picture of how ecoSCOPE TRUST ON CUSTOMER ATTITUDES AND
nomic systems operate. According to this view, a key factor
BEHAVIOR
contributing to the success of organizations and individuals
Previous research
has shown
that those
trust can influence
cusis legitimacy (Scott 2001). Legitimate
actions
are
that
tomer attitudes,to
such the
as customer
satisfaction (Selnes and
are proper and appropriate according
taken-for-

Sallis 2003),
and customer
as willingness
granted rules (or "institutions") that
exist
in thebehaviors,
social such
envipurchase aRoberts
company's product
or service
(Chaudhuri and
ronment (DiMaggio and Powellto1991;
and
GreenHolbrook
2001). The
functionalist
and institutional
wood 1997). These rules become
taken
for
granted
as a views
imply behavioral
different predictionsconstraints,
about the association between
result of broad agreement about
broad-scope
trust and
customer satisfaction
and purchase.
which can be formal (e.g., laws)
and/or
informal
(e.g.,
A and1996).
B in Figure
1 illustrate these different
norms) (North 1990; Peng and Panels
Heath
Institutionalperspectives.
ized rules foster "isomorphism";
they encourage all those
who operate in a system to behave and think as encouraged
by the system's institutions and, therefore, in similar ways
Figure 1

(Greenwood and Hinings 1996). Widely
accepted and
MODELS TESTED

enforced norms enable people to predict more accurately

how others will behave and, therefore, to operate more

A: The Institutional Theory Model: Narrow-Scope Trust Mediates the

effectively within the context (Nelson and
Sampat 2001).
Effect of Broad-Scope Trust

As institutional theorists often emphasize, legitimate

actions may be more effective in particular environments
but not necessarily the most efficient (Nelson and Sampat
Customer
2001; North 1990). For example, even if Country A's stansatisfaction
dard operating practices for running
a fast-food
business are
BroadNarrow-

more efficient than Country B's,
Country A's
practices
scope
scope

trust
trust
might not be more effective in Country
B, because
Country
B's employees and customers might not accept these pracCustomer
tices as legitimate.
purchase
Scholars who have taken an institutional theory perspective regarding the influence of broad-scope trust include

Lane and Bachman (Bachmann 2004; Lane and Bachmann
1996, 1997) and Budros (1992). These scholars agree that

narrow-scope trust reduces complexity
andTheory
uncertainty
inand Broad-Scope
B: The Functionalist
Model: Narrow-Scope
Both Have
a Direct
Effect likely
economic life, but they argue that it is more
(not
less)
to arise when it is legitimated by institutionalized trust,
which can be formal (e.g., system trust) or informal (e.g.,
generalized trust). When a context legitimates
trust,
it 'creBroad' Customer
ates broad agreement that trust building
satisfaction
scope is the standard
trust
approach for developing exchange relationships.
As a

result, those who build trust are able to operate more effectively in the system, whereas those who do not are, on average, less successful. (For an alternative Narrowexample, see
GamCustomer
scope
betta's [2000] analysis of organized crime
contexts,
in
purchase
trust
which distrust [rather than trust] is legitimated, and differ-

ent behaviors are therefore likely to be effective, even
though the overall system is less efficient.) In summary,
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As we mentioned in foundations
the previous
of the two predictions
section,
and by submitting
th
th
theorizing
to two
empirical tests.
theory view suggests
that
broad-scope
trus
because of any direct
Much
influence
empirical work on the on
influence
custom
of broad-scop
behaviors but rather
trust because
has hypothesized andit
supported
legitimate
the pattern predicte
trust, which in turn
by affects
the functionalist theory
customers.
perspective (FukuyamaTh
1995;
Guseva
and Rona-Tas
2001; McMillan
and Woodruff 1999;i
this view, broad-scope
trust
has
an indirect

ated

by

narrow-scope
Xin and trust)
Pearce 1996; Yamagishi,
on customer
Cook, and Watabe 199

behaviors. In contrast,
Zucker
the
1986). Two
functionalist
exceptions are research by
theo
Budros
that broad-scope trust
(1992)has
and Lane
aand
direct
Bachmann (1997),
positive
who hypothesiz
a

customer

attitudes and
and
bro
supportbehaviors.
the institutional theory As
perspective.
Ou

increases,
trust and

scope

it influences
researchcustomers
contributes to these results
in
in two
place
ways. First,
o
thus enables
customers
toour
rely
les
contrast
to previous empirical studies,
study recognize
trust. Therefore,
we
present
the possibility
of two again
alternative models
and explicitly tes

each one. As Bollen and Long (1992) suggest -and as art

predictions.
H2, (functionalist): The positive association between broadscope trust and customer attitudes and behaviors is
unmediated by narrow-scope trust.

H2b (institutional): The positive association between broadscope trust and customer attitudes and behaviors is fully
mediated by narrow-scope trust.
THE INFLUENCE OF BROAD-SCOPE TRUST

cles such as Jap and Ganesan's (2000) illustrate -importan
incremental information is generated by testing more tha
one theory-based relationship among the constructs withi
a single study. By making this comparison, our results sho
that though certain model specifications support some pre
dictions based on functionalist theory, a full model specif

cation supports the predictions based on institution
theory.

A second contribution of our study is related to our relatively direct assessment of customer trust. With the excepAs we suggested previously, several studies in marketing
tion of Yamagishi, Cook, and Watabe's (1998) experimental
have examined factors that promote or influence narrowwork, all the empirical studies we cited previously measure
scope trust. However, as we document in the Web Appenbroad-scope trust using more macrolevel proxies of cusdix, Part 1 (see http://www.marketingpower.com/jmrapril
tomer trust: nationality (Fukuyama 1995; Guseva and
PREVIOUS RESEARCH

Rona-Tas 2001; Lane and Bachmann 1996, 1997; McMil08), most of these have not examined how narrow-scope

trust is influenced by trust in factors beyond the exchange
lan and Woodruff 1999), number of trust-enhancing institurelationship. Instead, they have tended to investigate
how
tions
(Zucker 1986), journalistic accounts (Budros 1992),
narrow-scope trust is influenced by (1) characteristicsand
ofbusiness
the
ownership structure (Xin and Pearce 1996).
trusting party (e.g., the trusting party's expertise),Although
(2) thethese proxies are useful, they have two limitatrusting party's perceptions of the trusted party (e.g.,
tions.the
First, categorical variables, such as nationality or
trusted party's perceived abilities), and (3) the trusting
ownership structure, provide a relatively coarse metric for
party's perceptions of the exchange relationship (e.g.,
how a person's broad-scope trust. For example,
assessing
cooperative it is). The few studies that have examined
conbecause
customers within a particular country vary in their
textual factors have considered perceptions of the product/
levels of broad-scope trust, the country's mean level of
service category (Bart et al. 2005) or of the organizational
broad-scope trust may be an inaccurate reflection of a percontext (Moorman, Deshpande, and Zaltman 1993;son's
Smith
broad-scope trust and, therefore, an inappropriate preand Barclay 1997) but do not specifically focus on the
role
dictor
of his or her narrow-scope trust. A second and related
of trust in the broader exchange context. Furthermore,
issue isno
that these proxies are relatively indirect measures of
studies in marketing have identified or researched the
dif-perceptions. For example, journalistic accounts of
people's
ferent theoretical perspectives regarding the relationship
a business context's trustworthiness may be correlated with
between broad-scope and narrow-scope trust, which we
dis- actual trust in the context, but the strength of
a customer's
cussed in the previous section.
this correlation is likely to be lower than the correlation
Outside marketing, several articles and books have
dis- the same customer's ratings of trust and his or her
between
actualhave
trust in the context.
cussed the potential influence of broad-scope trust but

In addition to these limitations, which are common to
not empirically tested it. Many of these have expressed
either a functionalist theory perspective (Eisenstadtmost
1995;
or all previous empirical studies on this topic, many
Hosmer 1995; Luhmann 1979; Peng and Heath 1996) or
an
individual
studies also have their own specific limitations.
institutional theory perspective (Brenkert 1998; For
Hardin
example, Guseva and Rona-Tas (2001) do not explicitly
1996; Humphrey and Schmitz 1996; McKnight, measure
Cum- narrow-scope trust, Xin and Pearce's (1996) conmings, and Chervany 1998; Platteau 1994; Rowthornclusions
1999;are based on data collected from only 32 responSheppard and Sherman 1998) without noting that andents,
alterand McMillan and Woodruff (1999) examine only
native perspective exists. Other articles have mentioned
that with low broad-scope trust. In contrast, we
respondents
the influence of broad-scope trust on narrow-scopeexplicitly
trust measured both broad-scope and narrow-scope
could be negative or positive, but they have been silent
or
trust using
two samples (N = 586, and N = 261) we drew

ambivalent about which perspective is more likely
to abe
from
population of financial services customers who

supported empirically (Bigley and Pearce 1998; Hagen
and
patronized
five financial services organizations in two

Choe 1998; Jeffries and Reed 2000; Rousseau et al.
1998; These methodological improvements further
countries.
Wicks, Berman, and Jones 1999). We contribute highlight
to this
the contribution of our two studies to the theoreti-

body of nonempirical work by clarifying the theoretical
cal debate regarding the role of broad-scope trust in rela-

This content downloaded from
108.5.56.136 on Mon, 18 Jul 2022 21:13:18 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

246 JOURNAL OF MARKETING RESEARCH, APRIL 2008
tion to narrow-scope trust and customer
satisfaction
trusted party considers
the respondentand
before taking
purchase.
actions, (2) the trusted party will offer support on issues
important to the respondent, and (3) the trusted party is

concerned about the respondent's welfare. The selected
honesty measures focused on whether the respondent

STUDY 1: FINANCIAL SERVICES IN THE UNITED
KINGDOM

believes that (1) the trusted party keeps promises, (2) the
trusted party is sincere, and (3) the trusted party is telling
the truth, even if the explanation seemed unlikely. Cron-

Study Context

We surveyed customers who purchased a pension from
an independent financial adviser in the United Kingdom.
We selected these customers because the U.K. pension market experienced a crisis of trust during the late 1990s. During a six-year period, financial advisers systematically gave

bach's alphas for each of these scales appear in the Web
Appendix (see http://www.marketingpower.com/jmrapri108).
All are above .90 with the exception of system trust, whose

alpha was .78. To measure generalized trust, we used the
scale reported by Couch and Jones (1997) (Cronbach's a =

financially disadvantageous advice to approximately 1.5

.60). The customer attitude we examined was satisfaction,
which we measured on a scale adapted from the work of
Ganesan (1994) (Cronbach's a = .91). The customer behavior we examined was customer purchase, which we meas-

million U.K. customers, creating a range of views about the
trustworthiness of financial institutions and the agencies
that monitor them (Bruce 1999; Financial Services Authority 1999). Thus, we anticipated that our population of cus-

ured with a single question that asked respondents to report
the percentage of all investments invested with the financial

tomers would yield a sample with sufficient variance in
trust to allow a thorough examination of our hypotheses.

adviser.

Survey Development

Respondents

We report the survey items in the Web Appendix, Part 2

(see http://www.marketingpower.com/jmrapri108). Our
operationalization of trust was based on a definition shared

by several scholars (Bouty 2000; Doney, Cannon, and
Mullen 1998; Driscoll 1978; Geyskens, Steenkamp, and
Kumar 1998; Hosmer 1995; Jones and George 1998;
Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman 1995; McKnight, Cummings, and Chervany 1998) that views trust as a belief that
the firm or representative is benevolent (acts in the best

interests of the customer) and honest (does not lie or

misrepresent). To measure system trust, interpersonal trust,

Each of the four major financial services companies provided a list of approximately 1800 existing pension clients.
From a total sample of 6999, 586 surveys were returned, for

a response rate of 8.4%.1 We compared responses from
early and late respondents and found no systematic differences on any of this study's key constructs. Of the respondents, 40% were female. Additional demographic information appears in Table 2. Of the 586 respondents, 167 did not
report the percentage of their total portfolio invested with
the independent financial adviser. Thus, we initially per-

and firm-specific trust, we used Kumar, Scheer, and
Steenkamp's (1995a) trust measures, with the following
adaptations: First, because Kumar, Scheer, and Stenkamp's
(1995a) research context was different from ours, we made

minor adjustments to item wording. For example, their
measures refer to "the supplier" as the target of trust,
whereas ours refer to targets such as "my financial adviser."
Our system trust questions focused on government regulators because these were broadly publicized as being responsible for monitoring U.K. financial adviser performance.
Second, because of survey space constraints, we randomly
selected a subset of three (out of five) measures for each of
benevolence and honesty. The selected benevolence measures focused on whether the respondent believes that (1) the

'Although 586 respondents constitute a substantial sample size for
research of this kind, the response rate for Study 1 fell short of the norm.

Managers sponsoring the survey suggested that a primary driver of this
poor response rate was a question that asked respondents about the percentage of their investment portfolio invested with the adviser, which
respondents may have interpreted as an indirect attempt to assess the size
of their total investment portfolio. The percentage-invested question was
the only survey item that respondents systematically did not answer, which

supports this supposition. In an attempt to improve the response rate in
Study 2, we removed this question and achieved a rate of 35%. As we discuss in the concluding section of this article, the consistency of results
across our two studies helps minimize concerns that Study 1's response
rate produced a sample that biased the results.

Table 2

RESPONDENT AGE AND INCOME (STUDIES 1 AND 2)
Percentage Reporting Percentage Reporting Percentage Reporting Percentage Reporting

This Age in Study 1 This Age in Study 2 This Income in Study 1 This Income in Study 2
Age (United Kingdom) (Taiwan) Income ($) (United Kingdom) (Taiwan)
20-30
14
27
0-37,500
1
46
31-40
31
37
37,501-75,000
60
46
41-50
31
23
75,001-112,500
32
5
51-60
16
9
112,501-150,000
4
1
61-70
7
3
150,001-187,500
1
0
71-80
1
1
187,500+
2
2
Notes: Income information has been converted from local currency into U.S. dollars at an exchange rate that was current at the time of study
implementation.
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Common Method Variance
and Acquiescence
Biasall
analyses,
one
with

only

586

satisfaction
as
avariance
depend
To reduce concerns about common
method

and one with 419 respondents
(including
both
(CMV) and response biases,
we used several of the
proceand percentage invested
as
dependent
variable
dural remedies that Podsakoff and colleagues (2003, pp.
stantive results for both models are not diff
887-88) identify. To minimize social desirability biases, the
report the results of the model that includes b
survey's first page emphasized that each survey would be
variables.
submitted anonymously and that no identifying information
would be collected in the survey. In addition, each section
included text that reassured respondents that no particular
Measurement Validity
answer was encouraged or discouraged (i.e., "There are no
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics and correlations. We
right or wrong answers to these questions. We are just interused confirmatory factor analysis to assess construct
ested in your general impressions. You may circle any numvalidity in two stages. First, we assessed convergent and ber between 1 and 7"). To minimize CMV, the trust measdiscriminant validity for all latent variables with a confirures and the criterion variables used a different scale
matory factor analysis that modeled each survey item indiformat. We measured trust using a Likert scale format, and
vidually. The fit statistics for the measurement model were
we measured the criterion variables using a semantic differas follows: x2 = 521, d.f. = 349; root mean square error of
ential format (satisfaction) and a numeric format (percentapproximation (RMSEA) = .032; comparative fit index
age invested). Finally, all the items met Podsakoff and col(CFI) = .99; and adjusted goodness-of-fit index (AGFI) =
leagues' (2003) criteria for minimizing ambiguity (e.g., no
.91; all these are well within the acceptable range. Regarddouble-barreled questions, no complicated syntax).
ing discriminant validity, all latent variables met the test

In addition to procedural remedies, we used statistical

that Gerbing and Anderson (1988) recommend, in which

controls for CMV. Following Lindell and Whitney's (2001)
each pair of latent variables is analyzed by comparing the
recommendations, we selected a scale from our survey that
chi-square statistics when the correlation between the two
is theoretically unrelated to at least one scale used in our
was free versus constrained to one. For each pair, there was
analysis and therefore served as an "MV marker" (a proxy
a statistically significant decrement in fit when the path was
for method variance). The scale we selected measured cus-

constrained.

tomer awareness of government institutions and was
included in the survey by the managers sponsoring the

Second, we tested whether a better or equal fit could be
obtained with a more parsimonious measurement model, in

study. Because institutional awareness is theoretically unrelated to trust valence (which was measured by most of the

which each trust scale (e.g., firm-specific trust, system
trust) was summed and modeled as "parcel" or subdimen-

other survey items), we used these measures (Cronbach's

sion of one of two higher-order latent variables (broad-

.80) = .80) as our MV marker. We then selected the lowest
scope trust or narrow-scope trust) (Little, Cunningham, and
positive correlation (r = .04; see Table 3) between this scale
Shahar 2002). The fit for this model was significantly worse
and one of our criterion variables (percentage invested) as
than the original, primarily because the indicators of broadthe best estimate of method variance (Lindell and Whitney
scope trust (system trust and generalized trust) were not
2001, p. 118) and adjusted the correlations among our study

strongly correlated. However, a model in which only

constructs as follows:

narrow-scope trust was a higher-order latent variable produced a superior fit than the original: x2 = 195, d.f. = 137;

(1) rm)

RMSEA = .032; CFI = .98; AGFI = .93; and Axe = 396,

d.f. = 212, p < .001. Therefore, we used this model as a
basis for estimating the structural results. (Note that the

where rl3 is the correlation between construct i

substantive results from this model are the same as those

j, rm is the method variance adjustment, an

from a model in which narrow-scope trust is modeled as adjusted correlation. We report the results of t
two separate variables.)
Table 3 in a manner similar to Agustin and

Table 3

STUDY 1 (UNITED KINGDOM): CORRELATIONS AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
1

1.

System

3.

Narrow-scope

2.

4.

trust

2

3

(government)

Generalized

trust

trust

Satisfaction

.30**

.10*

5. Percentage invested .04
6. CMV marker (awareness)
M
3.27
4.26
SD
1.10
.91

.09*

.04

4

.26**

.14**

.18**

.07

5

.05

.02

.41**

.44**

4.45
1.90

.41**

.44**

-.02 .14** .14**
.12 -.02 .15** .17**

4.46
1.28

.17**

65.74
36.77

*p < .05.
* *p < .01

Notes: Zero-order correlations are reported below the diagonal; correlations adjusted for common method bias (Lindell and Whitney 2001) are reported
above the diagonal. CMV = common method variance.

This content downloaded from
108.5.56.136 on Mon, 18 Jul 2022 21:13:18 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

.05

.02

248 JOURNAL OF MARKETING RESEARCH, APRIL 2008
We report zero-order correlations below the diagonal
Figure 2 and

adjusted correlations above the diagonal.
We
RESULTS FOR
STUDYdetermined
1 (UNITED KINGDOM) MORE
the statistical significance of the adjusted
correlations
as THEORY MODEL
STRONGLY SUPPORT
THE INSTITUTIONAL
follows (Lindell and Whitney 2001):

(2) riim

A: Test of the Institutional Theory Model

Generalized
n.s.
As Lindell and Whitney (2001, p. 18) note, iftrust
any correlations that were statistically significant before41 the adjustment remain significant, "this suggests that the results can-

Customer
satisfaction

.59

n2

Narrow
scope

not be accounted for by CMV." A comparison of the

trust

correlations above and below the diagonal in Table 3 shows
System trust
that four of the eight significant correlations
between
.23 our
(government)
study constructs do not reach significance after42 adjustment
for measurement error. However, two of these four correla-

11

Customer

purchase
n2

.26

tions (between system trust and generalized trust and
between satisfaction and percentage invested) are not the
B: Test of the
focus of our study and therefore are not relevant to our
analyses, so these diagnostics suggest that CMV is unlikely
to affect a majority of our substantive results. Nonetheless,
Narrowscope
because the diagnostics also indicate that a minority of
rele-

Functionalist Theory Model

.60

trust

vant study correlations may be influenced by CMV, we
3
controlled for this variance in our analysis to minimize
method bias concerns. As Lindell and Whitney advise, andn.s.

26

Customer
satisfaction

similar to Agustin and Singh (2005), we included
a comGeneralized
n.s.
mon method factor (based on the marker variable) in
the
trust
structural equations analysis reported in the next subsec41
Customer
tion.2 Incorporating this factor in a structural equations n.s
purchase
model offers the advantage of accounting for measurement
12
error and hypothesized structural relationships in addition n.s.
System trust
to CMV, a benefit that the matrix adjustment approach
does
(government)
not provide.
42
We also used a statistical remedy for minimizing acquiescence bias. We measured acquiescence bias using the surNotes: To simplify the diagrams, we do not illustrate control variables
vey responses for generalized trust, which have an equal
1

number of positively and negatively worded items. Each
respondent was scored according to the level of acquiescence bias shown in the answers to this scale (we calculated
these scores for all possible combinations of positively and
negatively worded items and averaged them for each
respondent) (Baumgartner and Steenkamp 2001). We
included this measure as a control in our analysis (Agustin
and Singh 2005); as we show in the next section, this control does not affect the substantive conclusions supported
by the model.

and item loadings. For details, see the Web Appendix, Parts 3-5 (see
http://www.marketingpower.com/jmrapril08). n.s. = not statistically

significant.

ized coefficients for the key relationships examined in this
study. All standardized coefficients and fit statistics from a

maximum likelihood estimation (using LISREL 8.54) of
the two theoretical models appear in the Web Appendix,
Part 3 (see http://www.marketingpower.com/jmrapri108),
which also reports the effects for our CMV and acquiescence bias controls. In the discussion of our results, we
focus on the model results that include the control

Study Results

Simplified diagrams of the structural models we tested
appear in Figure 2. These diagrams highlight the standard-

2We initially followed Lindell and Whitney's (2001) advice to constrain
the paths from the method variance factor to be equal. With this constraint,

these path estimates were all .00, which reflects that the unconstrained
path coefficients are a mix of positive or negative numbers, are small
(ranging from -.02 to .01), and are statistically insignificant. Rather than
report model results in which the method variance bias is modeled as .00,
we take a more conservative approach by focusing our discussion on the
unconstrained model, which reflects some (rather than no) method variance effects. (Keeping or removing the constraint does not affect the substantive model results.)

variables, but as the Web Appendix, Part 3, shows, the substantive conclusions from all models (with or without controls) are the same. More detailed diagrams of the structural
models (including factor loadings for construct indicators)
appear in the Web Appendix, Parts 4 and 5 (see http://www.
marketingpower.com/jmrapri108).
We first compared the fit of the two models illustrated in

Figure 1. (Both models allowed for an estimation of the
correlation between exogenous variables, so the model in

Figure 1, Panel A, is nested within the model in Panel B.) If
broad-scope trust is best modeled as having a direct effect
on customer satisfaction and purchase, the addition of paths
shown in Figure 1, Panel B (functionalist theory model),
should increase the model's fit relative to Figure 1, Panel A
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STUDY 2: FINANCIAL
SERVICES
IN TAIWAN
(institutional theory model).
The
chi-square
sta
two models are not statistically different (Ax2
p > .05), indicating that
the
additional
A potential
shortcoming
of Study 1 is thatpaths
its results mayd
cantly improve model indicate
fit a and
suppor
culturally providing
or contextually idiosyncratic
pattern.
ated model (H2b) but For
not
ait direct-effect
mod
example,
is possible that broad-scope trust must
reach
thermore, the sign ofa certain
each
path
between
narro
threshold
before it
can begin to serve the
function
and all three types of
broad-scope
of narrow-scope
trust and that trust
this thresholdis
was sig
not

positive,

(Hib)

but

which

not

the

supports
the
institutional
crossed in Study
1 because
the United Kingdom's pension

t

functionalist
theory
misselling crisis produced
particularly model
low broad-scope(

We then examined whether the conditions that Baron and

trust. Furthermore, previous research suggests that com-

Kenny (1986) outline support the mediation predicted in pared with members of Asian cultures, British respondents
H2b. If mediation exists, three conditions will hold: First, may not be as culturally predisposed to the influence of

broad-scope trust will have a significant association with
institutions and norms that constitute broad-scope trust. For
narrow-scope trust. As Figure 2, Panel A, shows, this condi- example, building on Hofstede's (1980) observation that

tion holds for system trust (government) (k12 = .23, t = members of Asian cultures tend to have higher uncertainty
3.78). Second, narrow-scope trust will have a significant avoidance, Doney, Cannon, and Mullen (1998) suggest that
association with the dependent variables. As Figure 2, Panel Asian cultures place more value than Western cultures on
A, also shows, this condition holds (B21 = .59, t = 8.00; institutions and norms that guarantee trust. Furthermore,
B31 = .26, t = 4.41). Third, broad-scope trust will have a greater power distance in Asian cultures may increase the
significant association with the dependent variables in the influence of institutions that guarantee trust (Doney, Canabsence of narrow-scope trust -an association that will non, and Mullen 1998), and greater collectivism in Asian
reduce or become nonsignificant when narrow-scope trust cultures may increase the influence of norms that regulate

is included in the model. To test whether there is a direct

trust (Atuahene-Gima and Li 2002). Therefore, it is possieffect of broad-scope trust on the dependent variables, weble that the influence of broad-scope trust is stronger in
estimated a model in which only system trust and general- Asian cultures and that this influence rises to the point at
ized trust (not narrow-scope trust) were direct antecedents which it can substituted for some of the function served by
of customer satisfaction and purchase. For this model, the narrow-scope trust. Assessing the cultural specificity of
coefficient of the direct path from system trust (govern-Study 1's findings is the main purpose of Study 2. We conment) to customer satisfaction was .13 (p < .05), and to cus- ducted Study 2 in Taiwan because Hofstede (1980) identi-

tomer purchase, it was .06 (marginally significant at p <fies it as being significantly different from the United King.10). As Figure 2, Panel B, shows, when we included dom on the key dimensions of uncertainty avoidance,
narrow-scope trust, there was no significant associationpower distance, and collectivism.
between broad-scope trust and the dependent variables. Study 2 also addresses a limitation of Study 1. As we
Because these paths are significant (or marginally signifi- mentioned in our definition of system trust, guardians of

cant) in the absence of the mediator and are nonsignificant system trust can include institutions other then governmenin the mediator's presence, full mediation is indicated.
tal regulatory bodies, such as professional associations (see
To examine this mediational effect further, we performedalso Atchinson 2005). Therefore, we expanded our measa Sobel (1982) test to determine whether the indirect effecturement of system trust to include measurement of trust in
of broad-scope trust on satisfaction and percentage investedthe professional association responsible for governing stanis significantly different from zero. Because generalized dards of conduct in the financial services industry.

trust is not significantly associated with the mediator

(narrow-scope trust), we performed this test only on system
trust (government). As a predictor of satisfaction, the testSurvey Development
statistic for system trust (government) is z = 6.45 (p < .01),
To maximize study comparability and to minimize alterand as a predictor of percentage invested, the test statistic isnative explanations for any different results between the
z = 2.72 (p < .01). This further supports the proposition thattwo studies, we used nearly all the same survey items as in

the effect of system trust (government) is mediated byStudy 1. (Ryan and colleagues [1999, p. 38] argue that surnarrow-scope trust. As another test, we used Brown's vey standardization across cultures is beneficial only when
(1997) recommendation for testing mediation with struc- concerns about measurement inequivalence between con-

tural equations. In the matrix showing the indirect effects oftexts can be minimized, and we report the results of meas(ksi) on Ti (eta), the indirect effect of system trust (gov- urement equivalence tests subsequently.) Study 2's survey
ernment) on satisfaction is significant (z = 3.82, p < .01), asdiffered from that of Study 1 in three ways. First, we added
is the indirect effect of system trust (government) on per- six questions to measure trust in the Financial Investment
centage invested (z = 3.10, p < .01). Therefore, the results and Trust Association, a professional association in Taiwan

of this analysis support the same conclusions as thosethat is known for setting standards of conduct in the finanobtained with the Sobel test. In summary, although Study cial services industry. We adapted these additional ques1's results for generalized trust were not significant (and tions from the work of Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp
thus support neither theory), the results for system trust(1995a) in the same way as in Study 1. Second, because of
(government) provide support for the institutional theoryevidence that the percentage-invested question dampened
model (Hib and H2b) but not for the functionalist theory Study l's response rate (see n. 1), we removed this question
model (Hia and H2a). We present a full discussion of these from Study 2's survey. Third, a bilingual native in Taiwan

results in the final section.

translated the English-language survey into Chinese, and a
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bilingual student living in the United
results of ourStates
analysis metback-translated
or exceeded these cutoffs. This
suggests that
the measures
usedof
in the the
two studies
were sufit into English. Cronbach's alphas
for
each
scales
appear in the Web Appendix (see
ficiently
http://www.marketing
equivalent, despite the different language and
(Ryan et al.
1999).
power.com/jmrapri108), and all respondents
are above
.80.

CMV and Acquiescence Bias

Respondents

To control for CMV and acquiescence bias, we used the
A major financial services organization provided a list of
same procedural and statistical remedies as in Study 1. We
750 clients who had a relationship
with asone
its
used awareness
an MV of
marker
andfinancial
selected the lowest
advisers. In total, 261 surveys were returned, for a response

positive correlation (r = .02; see Table 4) between this
rate of 35%. Of the respondents, 45% were female. We

marker and one of our variables (firm-specific trust) as the
report additional demographic information
in Table
2. (We could not use the
best estimate of method
variance.
correlation with our criterion variable [satisfaction] because
Measurement Validity
this correlation is negative [r = -.03; see Lindell and Whit-

ney 2001,and
p. 118].)
We report the adjusted
Table 4 reports descriptive statistics
correlations.
We correlations

above the diagonal
in Table 4, approach
and all the statistically sigassessed construct validity using
the same

nificant correlations
remain
significant
after the adjustment.
described in Study 1. The fit statistics
for
the
resulting
Although x2
this suggests
that
as in =
Study
1, method variance
measurement model were as follows:
= 913,
d.f.
467;
is
unlikely
to
affect
the
substantive
results
of Study 2, for
RMSEA = .063; CFI = .99; and AGFI = .78; all latent

variables meet the Gerbing and Anderson (1988) pairwise the sake of consistency with Study 1 and conservatism
test described for Study 1. We also tested a more parsimo-regarding CMV, we model both method variance and acquiescence bias as controls.
nious measurement model and found that as in Study 1, we
obtained a superior fit when narrow-scope trust was modStudy Results
eled as a higher-order latent variable (x2 = 410, d.f. = 235;
As mentioned, we surveyed customers in Taiwan partly
RMSEA = .053; CFI = .99; and AGFI = .85). Therefore,
because
we anticipated that they would have higher levels
this is the model we used for testing hypotheses. (As with
of
broad-scope
trust and that the role of broad-scope trust
Study 1, the substantive results from this model are the
might therefore be different from the role identified in
same as those resulting from a model in which narrowStudy 1. Using an analysis of variance, we confirmed that
scope trust is depicted as two separate variables.)
For this study, an additional measurement validity con-the mean system trust (government) and generalized trust
cern arose because the survey items were developed forratings of Study 2 participants were significantly greater
(p < .05) than those of Study 1 (compare the bottom rows
Western respondents, raising questions about the crosscultural applicability of our survey. Following the recom- of Tables 3 and 4). As we show in this section, despite this
mendations of Ryan and colleagues (1999) and Lytle anddifference in overall level of broad-scope trust, the data colcolleagues (1995), we used multiple-groups covariance lected in Taiwan support the institutional theory model,
which was also supported by Study 1's data.
structure analysis to examine whether Study 1 's factor
structure was sufficiently similar to that of Study 2. Ryan Simplified diagrams of the structural models we tested
and colleagues specify a cutoff standard of .08 for theappear in Figure 3. These diagrams highlight the standardized coefficients for the key relationships we examined in
RMSEA and of .90 for both the nonnormed fit index
this study. All standardized coefficients and fit statistics
(NNFI) and the incremental fit index (IFI). With an

RMSEA of .08, an NNFI of .93, and an IFI of .93, the

Table 4

from a maximum likelihood estimation (using LISREL

8.54) of the two models appear in the Web Appendix, Part 6
(see http://www.marketingpower.com/jmrapri108), which
also reports the effect of our CMV and acquiescence bias

controls. (Making the method paths equal [Lindell and

STUDY 2 (TAIWAN): CORRELATIONS AND DESCRIPTIVE
STATISTICS

Whitney 2001] had the same effect we described in n. 2.) In
our discussion of the results, we focus on those that include

the control variables, but as the Web Appendix, Part 6,
1

2

3

4

5

1. System trust (government) .39* .18* .55* .55*
2. System trust (professional

associations) .40* .30* .54* .42*

3. Generalized trust .20* .31* .46* .46*

4. Narrow-scope trust .56* .55* .47* .47*
5. Satisfaction .43* .43* .44* .44*

6. CMV marker (awareness) .02 .03 .09 .02 .02
M

3.91

SD

1.42

4.22
1.02

5.16
.93

4.94

5.27

1.27

1.11

*p < .01.
Notes: Zero-order correlations are reported below the diagonal; correla-

tions adjusted for common method bias (Lindell and Whitney 2001) are
reported above the diagonal.

shows, the substantive conclusions from all models are the

same. More detailed diagrams of the structural models
(including factor loadings for construct indicators) appear

in the Web Appendix, Parts 7 and 8 (see http://www.
marketingpower.com/jmrapri108).
We first compared the fit of the two models illustrated in
Figure 1. As was the case in Study 1, if broad-scope trust is
best modeled as having a direct effect on customer satisfaction and purchase, the addition of paths shown in Figure 1,
Panel B (functionalist theory model), should increase the
model's fit relative to Figure 1, Panel A (institutional theory
model). The chi-square statistics for the two models are not
statistically different (Ax2 = 3, d.f. = 3, p > .05), indicating
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Figure 3
RESULTS FOR STUDY 2 (TAIWAN) MORE STRONGLY SUPPORT THE INSTITUTIONAL THEORY MODEL
A: Test of the Institutional Theory Model

System trust

professional
association
n1

.30
Narrow-

trust

2

System trust
(government)

Customer
satisfaction

scope

Generalized

trust

.33

12

.76

111

.39

3

B: Test of the Functionalist Theory Model

Narrowscope
trust

.74

il.

System trust

(professional

n.s.

association)
41

Customer
satisfaction
n.s.

Ili

Generalized
trust

42
n.s.

System trust
(government)
43

Notes: To simplify the diagrams, we do not illustrate control variables and item loadings. For details, see the Web Appendix, Parts 3-5 (see
http://www.marketingpower.com/jmrapri108). n.s. = not statistically significant.

that the additional paths do not significantly improve model
fit and providing support for a mediated model (H2b) but
not a direct-effect model (H2a). Furthermore, the sign of
each path between narrow-scope trust and all three types of
broad-scope trust is significant and positive, which supports

the institutional theory model (Hib) but not the functionalist
theory model (H i a).

We then examined whether our data support the mediation conditions mentioned in Study 1. As Figure 3, Panel A,
shows, all three types of broad-scope trust have a signifi-
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cant association with narrow-scopeclaims
trust
(Condition
1).we
The
in previous
research (which
mention in the introfigure also shows that narrow-scope
trust
has2) a
significant
duction
to Study
that
this kind of trust wields more
association with customer satisfaction
(Condition
2). To
test
strength
in Asian cultures.
Nonetheless,
the combined
Condition 3, we estimated a model results
in which
only
the that
three
of both studies
indicate
though the levels of
types of broad-scope trust (not narrow-scope
trust)
were between different
trust and the strength
of the associations
direct antecedents of satisfaction. For
model,
coeffitypesthis
of trust
may differthe
between
contexts, the fundamental
cient of the direct path to satisfaction
from
trust
relationships
amongsystem
these types of
trust are not necessarily
(government) was .31 (t = 6.97), from
system
trust
different.
Both studies
point(profesto the important potential role
sional association) was .18 (t was 5.30),
and and
from
generalized
of formal
informal
institutions in legitimizing the
trust was .39 (t = 3.85). However,
as Figure
Panel
behaviors
of firms and3,
individuals
and B,
raise questions about
shows, when we include narrow-scope
trust
model,
whether
trust's in
role the
in supporting
economic and social
there is no significant association
organization
between
is best described
broad-scope
in terms of functionalism and
trust and satisfaction. Because the efficiency.
direct Our
paths
results are
suggestsignifithat the influence of trust in
the and
businessare
context
on customer attitudes and behaviors is
cant in the absence of the mediator
nonsignificant
in the mediator's presence, full mediation
isfirm/representative
indicated -just
indirect and that
trust plays a key medias it was for system trust (government)
Study
ating rolein
with
regard to 1.
this influence. Thus, the answer to
To test this mediational effect further,
we performed
a
our title's question,
"Is Firm Trust Essential
in a Trusted
Sobel (1982) test on the indirect effect
of allappears
three
of
Environment?"
to betypes
yes.
broad-scope trust. For system trust (government) as a pre-

Managerial Implications
dictor of satisfaction, the test statistic
was z = 5.51 (p <

.01); for system trust (professional association),
the
staAlthough many factors
can test
influence
narrow-scope trust,
tistic was z = 4.60 (p < .01); and forour
generalized
the
results suggest thattrust,
a potentially
important factor is the
of trust
that customers
have in the business context in
test statistic was z = 3.41 (p < .01). level
This
further
supports
the proposition that the effect of broad-scope
trust
is mediwhich a firm operates.
Therefore,
managers are correct to
ated by narrow-scope trust. Using be
Brown's
(1997)
test,
asis low or declining
concerned when
broad-scope
trust
we described in Study 1, the parameter
estimates
show
that
(Colvin 2004),
and they should
consider
the potential benethe indirect effect of system trust fits
(government)
on satisfacof proactively influencing
this trust. For example, mantion is significant (z = 5.59, p < .01),
as and
is firms
thecan
indirect
effect
agers
support and invest
in professional assoof system trust (professional association)
4.60,
< .01)
ciations that (z
help=
establish
or p
reinforce
industry standards
and generalized trust (z = 3.45, p < (Barnett
.01). 2001),
Thus,
incan
terms
of the prosecution
or they
actively support
our theory test, the conclusions from
of companies
Study
that
2 threaten
are the
customer
same
confidence (Klock
as those from Study 1. They provide
additional
for
2001).
Many managerssupport
oppose industry
regulation (even if
the institutional theory prediction that
broad-scope
trust
hasthat the resultit is self-regulation)
because they
anticipate
a direct positive influence on narrow-scope
ant requirements will
trust
constrain
(Hib)
their firms
and
from engaging in
that this effect is fully mediated by
narrow-scope
trust 2000). However,
certain
profitable activities (Durchslag
(H2b). We found no evidence for the
therefunctionalist
is a trade-off here: Nottheory
supporting government agenperspective.
cies and professional associations may result in less regulation, but it may also reduce broad-scope trust, which in turn
DISCUSSION OF STUDIES 1 AND 2
can dampen narrow-scope trust.
Although previous work has argued that broad-scope
Managers may also be reluctant to invest in developing
trust may have either a positive or a negative influence
on trust because all firms benefit when trust in the
broad-scope
broader context is high. However, perhaps the most impornarrow-scope trust, no study has submitted these alternative
predictions to an empirical test. The results of our two
tantstudpractical implication of our research is that if broadscope trust's
ies suggest that the influence of broad-scope trust
on influence is wholly mediated by narrow-scope
narrow-scope trust is positive and that this influencetrust
is fully
(as our results suggest), the free riding available to
firms as a result of high broad-scope trust is limited. Even
mediated by narrow-scope trust. This supports the institutional theory model. It also shows that not explicitly
when broad-scope trust is high, managers and firms must
accounting for the potential mediational role of narrowstill commit the resources to develop narrow-scope trust
before
they can fully benefit from the customer attitudes
scope trust may create a false impression; specifically,
withbehaviors that are fostered by trust. If, as our research
out considering mediation, the positive association and
between
broad-scope trust and customer satisfaction and purchase
suggests, broad-scope trust is not a substitute for narrow(see Tables 3 and 4) could be interpreted as a direct scope
effect
trust, firms are never freed from the necessity of
individual trusting relationships with their cusand, thus, as support for the functionalist theory developing
model.
tomers, regardless of the level of broad-scope trust.
This may explain why some previous empirical research

has supported a functionalist theory model (particularly

Study Limitations and Future Directions
research based on case-study or observational data, which
of our studies has unique methodological shortcomare not always well suited for distinguishing between Each
direct
ings. However, when similar results are produced by more
and indirect causal relationships).
than
one study, this minimizes concern that study idiosynIn terms of specific relationships among constructs,
there

were some differences between the two studies. For exam-

crasies produced anomalous effects (Lindsay and Ehren-

berg 1993). Nonetheless, some limitations are important to
ple, the coefficients associated with broad-scope trust in
Study 2 were greater than those in Study 1. This supports mention. First, only one of our studies measured customer
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conditions
in which they
play a stronger
or weaker role than
behavior, so compared
with
other
findings
w
more speculative to generalize
more institutionally based broad-scope
about
trust. the effe
If we accept that
broad-scope trust line.
is a significant
scope trust on a company's
bottom
Secon
antecedent
of narrow-scope trust, perceptions
it is worthwhile to conour study measured
customer
sider whatof
factorsprevious
foster broad-scope trust.research
In our section
directly than a majority
on generalized trust,
mentioned
several potential
ence of broad-scope trust,
wewedid
not
measur

antecedents.
Additional
ideas might come from
previous
logical processes that
may
parallel
the
soci
research on narrow-scope trust. Some theory
of the factors that
cesses described by institutional
or
influence narrow-scope
trust, such as communication
theory. A psychological
perspective
on the
(Anderson and Narus 1990)
and experience (Bart
et al.
broad-scope trust in further
research
would
2005; Moorman,
Deshpande, and Podsakoff
Zaltman 1993), might
role of broad-scope trust.
Third,
a

similarly influence broad-scope
trust.statistical
(For example, gov(2003) identify four categories
of
r
ernmentare
institutions
might enhance consumer
trust in
controlling CMV, which
arrayed
in terms
market-relevant legislation
communicating more fretageous they are. Although
our by
approach
falls
quently with consumers.)
research might alsoit d
most advantageous category
of Further
solutions,
the influence
of broad-scope
trust compares
some of the benefits examine
of how
the
most
advantageo
with the influence
of previously identified
antecedents of inte
such as capturing potential
method
x trait
narrow-scope trust.
Regarding our conceptualization
of firm-spe
we note that both researchers and customers can view firms

Finally, although our two samples reflected different
as either contexts or entities, depending on perspective mean trust ratings, the ratings in both studies tended to be

(Morgeson and Hofmann 1999). On the one hand, the firm at or above the scale midpoint, suggesting relatively high
broad-scope trust. This may be partly a result of our decicharacteristics that foster or undermine trust. We argue thatsion to survey customers who are existing bank customers
this view of firm-specific trust is particularly appropriateand thus presumably have relatively high levels of broadwhen considering the perspective of individuals who oper-scope trust. Further research might examine whether a comate within the firm. For example, the trust that organiza-parative model test among respondents with relatively low
tional employees have in one another is directly influencedbroad-scope trust would produce the same results. If broadby the context in which they work, including an organiza- scope trust helps legitimate narrow-scope trust, what haption's formal rules and informal norms. In these situations,pens when this legitimation function is particularly weak?
trust in the firm is broad in scope because it applies to mul-It is possible that the dynamics of markets or social groups
tiple individuals who work within the firm (Driscoll 1978).in which broad-scope trust is relatively low are qualitatively
On the other hand, the firm can be viewed as an entity withdifferent from those in which broad-scope trust is relatively

can be viewed as an environment with its own institutional

which a person might develop a relationship, just as some-high.
one might develop a relationship with an individual (Johnson and Selnes 2004); this is particularly true for a firm's
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